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Anyone who suggests that users and vendors have equal bargaining
power in negotiating and drafting computer contracts must be working
for a vendor. Except in a few situations where the user is a major corporation with considerable experience, not only in data processing but
in the products of the particular vendor in question, the user is at a distinct disadvantage at every stage of the contracting process.
This Article discusses some of the problems faced by users in vendor-user litigation. The first part focuses on the various factual and
contractual realities in which the user must operate. It examines
briefly the advantages the vendor has in the negotiating stage, and then
focuses on a number of contractual clauses that provide the vendor an
enormous advantage in any subsequent litigation.
The second part of the Article focuses on the various causes of action a user should consider in vendor-user litigation. Those users who
believe that the only claim they can bring against a non-performing
vendor is for breach of contract are simply playing by the vendor's
rules. Tort remedies avoid many of the contractual restrictions used by
vendors to their advantage, and provide the user with strong ammunition for recovering substantial damages for vendor malefactions.
I.

NEGOTIATING AND DRAFTING THE CONTRACT
A.

NEGOTIATING PROBLEMS

A user's problems start as soon as it contacts the vendor. In most
instances the user has virtually no computer expertise, has no knowl-
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edge of the vendor's products, and has no means of evaluating the sales
literature, the salesperson's representations, or even the technical documentation the vendor may or may not provide. Numerous books and
articles have been written on how the user should approach the acquisition of a computer system, and techniques that can be used to "even the
odds."' Unfortunately, vendors read these books as well, and have a
counter-technique for virtually every technique suggested in the literature. The bottom line is that the advantage will always be in favor of
the vendor in any negotiations. That advantage is then compounded by
the use of various "standard" terms in the computer contract itself.
B.

CONTRACTING PROBLEMS

If there is any standard in the computer industry, it is that vendors
use standard form purchase/license agreements for all transactions involving their products. While there may be some negotiated "give and
take" on some of the terms, such as delivery date or price, there are
several standard terms that are almost always deemed "non-negotiable"
by the vendor. These include an integration clause,2 warranty disclaim4
ers or exclusions, 3 and limitations on liability and remedies.
In addition, vendor contracts seldom contain attorneys' fees provisions,5 while they often contain provisions shortening the period in
which any action must be brought for breach, 6 and dictating the state
law under which the contract will be construed or the court in which
any action arising out of the contract must be brought. 7 Taken together, these provisions provide the vendor with an almost insurmountable barrier against any meaningful legal action for its failure to
perform.
1.

Integration Clause
Negotiations for a computer contract are often lengthy. They may

involve numerous people with different levels of expertise; may include
many offers, rejections, counteroffers and partial acceptances; and may
involve the exchange of numerous documents. At some point, however,
if the negotiations are successful, the parties believe that they "have a
deal": that is, the parties believe that they have reached unanimity (a
1.
(1983);
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

See, e.g., B. DONOHUE, HOW TO Buy AN OFFICE COMPUTER OR WORD PROCESSOR
J. AUER & C. HARRIS, COMPUTER CONTRACT NEGOTIATIONS (1981).
See infra text accompanying notes 8-13.
See infra text accompanying notes 14-33.
See infra text accompanying notes 34-59.
See infra text accompanying note 60.
See infra text accompanying notes 61-64.
See infra text accompanying notes 65-67.
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"meeting of the minds") on all material terms of the subject matter of
the negotiations.
A crucial step, once the "deal" has been made, is to reduce it to
writing, have all the parties agree that the writing accurately reflects
the deal, and obtain the necessary signatures to finalize it. To insure
that previous negotiations do not come back to haunt the parties, the
contract usually includes an integration clause of the following general
form: "The parties agree that this Agreement is the complete and exclusive statement of the agreement between the parties, which supersedes all proposals and prior agreements, oral or written, and all other
communications between the parties relating to the subject matter of
this agreement."
An integrated contract is one that is interpreted solely according to
the terms contained therein.8 Such an agreement discharges former
contracts to the extent that they are inconsistent with and within the
scope of the subsequent integrated agreement. 9 Thus, such prior written
or oral agreements are rendered inoperative by the integration clause.
"A writing intended by the parties as a final expression of [the parties']
agreement with respect to such terms as are included therein may not
be contradicted by evidence of any prior agreement or of a contemporaneous oral agreement ....
While the integration clause is not in and of itself a contracting
"evil," it can be used by an unscrupulous vendor as a shield from liability for intentional misrepresentations made during negotiations. The
salesperson is well aware that the final contract will contain an integration clause, and thus may have no qualms about "stretching the truth"
in claims for the vendor's products. Since such claims will not appear
in the final contract, the integration clause guards against a later assertion that the user relied on those claims in entering into the contract.
Because the integration clause will normally preclude any evidence
of prior oral representations in a breach of contract action, its value to
the vendor is great. The only viable method of avoiding the effect of
the integration clause is to allege claims based on a tort theory, such as
fraud 1 or bad faith,12 under which testimony concerning all of the pre13
liminary negotiations will be admissible.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 212(1) (1981).
9. Id. § 213.
10. U.C.C. § 2-202 (1979). See Westfield Chem. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 6 Computer
L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 438, 441 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1977); Bakal v. Burroughs Corp., 74
Misc. 2d 202, 205-06, 343 N.Y.S.2d 541, 545 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1972); National Cash Register Co.
v. Modern Transfer Co., 224 Pa. Super. 138, 302 A.2d 486 (1973).
11. See infra text accompanying notes 249-96.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 297-308.
13. See Scrimgeour v. Magazine, 429 A.2d 187, 188 (D.C. 1981); RESTATEMENT (SEC8.
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Warranty Disclaimersand Exclusions

The Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C. or the Code) provides for
both express and implied warranties in a contract for the sale of
goods.14 These warranties, however, can be disclaimed or excluded by
appropriate contract language. 15 While courts view such exclusions
with some hostility, 16 they are routinely upheld.' 7 A typical disclaimer
reads as follows: "Except as expressly provided herein, there are no
other warranties, express or implied, including, but not limited to, any
implied warranties of merchantability or fitness for a particular
purpose."
a. Express warranties: Express warranties are more difficult to
disclaim than implied warranties. Representations and promises found
to be part of the agreement will usually bind the vendor despite an express warranty disclaimer.' 8 An integration clause, however, will minimize the possibility that earlier oral or written representations will be
upheld. 19
b. Implied warranties: Implied warranty disclaimers are much
more likely than express warranty disclaimers to be effective, provided
certain formal requirements are satisfied. The disclaimer clause should
be in writing and must be conspicuous. 20 In general, to disclaim
merchantability the disclaimer should "mention the word
merchantability and in case of a writing must be conspicuous." 21 To disclaim fitness for a particular purpose the disclaimer "must be by a writing and conspicuous.

' 22

Even these requirements, however, are not absolute. The Code permits the use of "expressions like 'as is', 'with all faults' or other lanOND) OF CONTRACTS

§ 214(c), (d) (1981); U.C.C. § 1-203 (1977). See also Sweet, Promissory

Fraudand the Parol Evidence Rule, 49 CALIF. L. REV. 877 (1961).

14. U.C.C. §§ 2-313, 2-314 (1979).
15. Id. § 2-719.
16. See, e.g., Burroughs Corp. v. Chesapeake Petroleum & Supply Co., 282 Md. 406,
384 A.2d 734 (1978).
17. See Applications Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 501 F. Supp. 129, 133 (S.D.N.Y.
1980); Kalil Bottling Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 127 Ariz. 278, 287, 619 P.2d 1055, 1058 (Ct.
App. 1980).
18. See Consolidated Data Terminals v. Applied Digital Data Sys., Inc., 708 F.2d 385,
391 (9th Cir. 1983) (disclaimer cannot be permitted to override highly particularlized warranty created by the specifications). But see Westfield Chem. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 6
Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 438 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1977) (disclaimer of both express and implied warranties upheld).
19. Bakal v. Burroughs Corp., 74 Misc. 2d 202, 343 N.Y.S.2d 541 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1972).
20. U.C.C. § 2-316(2) (1979).
21. Id.
22. Id.
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guage which in common understanding calls the buyer's attention to the
exclusion of warranties and makes plain that there is no implied warranty."23 In addition, a phrase such as, "there are no warranties which
extend beyond the description on the face hereof," will exclude all warranties of fitness.24 Although narrowly construed, 25 such disclaimers
26
will be upheld if they are conspicuous and unambiguous.
The behavior of the buyer can affect the existence of implied
warranties.
[W]hen the buyer before entering into the contract has examined the
goods or the sample or model as fully as he desired or has refused to
examine the goods there is no implied warranty with regard to defects
which7 an examination ought in the circumstances to have revealed to
him.2

The "examination" is not the "inspection" that is related to acceptance
or rejection of the goods.28 Instead, it refers to the selection process,
such as attending a demonstration of a computer system, or actual use
by the purchaser prior to entering into the agreement.
Due to the complexity of computer systems the scope of "defects
the examination might have revealed" is narrower than in the case of
staple goods. In Sperry Rand Corp. v. Industrial Supply Corp.,29 the
court held that the fact that the buyer had possession of the system for
a considerable period of time prior to the purchase did not result in a
waiver of the implied warranty of fitness. "[A]n implied warranty can
also be excluded or modified by course of dealing or course of performance or usage of trade. '30 As such, a buyer should be quick to notify
the seller of any defects in performance.
The implied warranty of merchantability can be negated by an inconsistent express warranty. 3 1 For example, where a contract specifies
standards of performance for a computer system, the vendor will not be
held liable to any higher standard that might have been imposed by the
23. Id. § 2-316(3)(a).
24. Id. § 2-316(2).
25. See, e.g., Burroughs Corp. v. Chesapeake Petroleum & Supply Co., 282 Md. 406,
384 A.2d 734 (1978); National Cash Register Co. v. Adell Indus., 57 Mich. App. 413, 416, 225
N.W.2d 785, 787 (1975).
26. See, e.g., Badger Bearing Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 444 F. Supp. 919, 922-23 (E.D.
Wis. 1977); Investors Premium Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 389 F. Supp. 39, 45 (D.S.C. 1974),
affd, 588 F.2d 838 (7th Cir. 1978); Westfield Chem. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 6 Computer
L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 438 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1977); Bakal v. Burroughs Corp., 74 Misc.
2d 202, 343 N.Y.S.2d 541 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1972); W.R. Weaver Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 580
S.W.2d 76, 81 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979).
27. U.C.C. § 2-316(3)(b) (1979).
28. Id § 2-316 comment 8.
29. 337 F.2d 363, 370 (5th Cir. 1964).
30. U.C.C. § 2 -316(3)(c) (1979).
31. Id § 2-317(c).
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implied warranty. The implied warranty of fitness, however, cannot be
displaced by an express warranty, 32 and both will be deemed operative
33
and cumulative in nature.
3. Limitations on Liability/Remedies
The remedies available to an aggrieved party for breach of warranty, and the liability of the breaching party, may be limited by contract. 34 One method is to include in the contract a clause that provides
a specific, exclusive, limited remedy, such as repair or replacement of
defective parts;35 a limitation on the total liability of the vendor to a
specific dollar amount, such as the total price paid on the contract or
the total amount paid during the last six months; 36 or exclusion of all
indirect or consequential damages. 37 These limitation clauses must be
carefully drafted, as any ambiguity will be construed against the drafting party. 38 Furthermore, limitations in one contract of a multi-contract transaction will not apply to the other contracts. 39 In addition to a
claim of ambiguity, an injured party can claim that the limitation clause
should not be enforced because it is unconscionable or because it failed
of its essential purpose.
a. Unconscionability: The Code provides that "[c]onsequential
damages may be limited or excluded unless the limitation or exclusion
is unconscionable." 40 In W.R. Weaver Co. v. Burroughs Corp.,41 the
contract excluded all money damages and limited the buyer's remedy to
32. Id.
33. See Chatlos Sys., Inc. v. National Cash Register Co., 479 F. Supp. 738, 743 (D.N.J.
1979), modified, 635 F.2d 1081 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. dismissed, 457 U.S. 1112 (1982).
34. U.C.C. §§ 2-316(4), 2-718, 2-719 (1979).
35. Id.§ 2-719(a); Chatlos Sys., Inc. v. National Cash Register Co., 479 F. Supp. 738
(D.N.J. 1979) (to be effective the repair remedy must be provided within a reasonable
time after discovery of the defect), modified, 635 F.2d 1081 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. dismissed,
457 U.S. 1112 (1982).
36. Farris Eng'g Corp. v. Service Bureau Corp., 276 F. Supp. 643, 645 (D.N.J. 1967),
affd, 406 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1969).
37. Hi Neighbor Enters. v. Burroughs Corp., 492 F. Supp. 823, 826 (N.D. Fla. 1980);
Teamster Sec. Fund v. Sperry Rand Corp., 6 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 951, 96768 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
38. See Lovely v. Burroughs Corp., 165 Mont. 209, 219, 527 P.2d 557, 563 (1977). See
also Consolidated Data Terminals v. Applied Digital Data Sys., Inc., 708 F.2d 385 (9th Cir.
1983) (limitation clause held to apply only to loss of use of defective equipment; damages
for loss of customer goodwill awarded).
39. See, e.g., Huntington Beach Union High School Dist. v. Continental Information
Sys. Corp., 452 F. Supp. 538, 541 (C.D. Cal. 1978), modified, 621 F.2d 353 (9th Cir. 1980);
Carl Beasley Ford, Inc. v. Burroughs Corp., 361 F. Supp. 325, 332-33 (E.D. Pa. 1973), affd.
493 F.2d 1400 (3d Cir. 1974).
40. U.C.C. § 2-719(3) (1979); see also id. § 2-302.
41. 580 S.W.2d 76 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979).
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repair or replacement of defective parts. The court held that "[s]uch
agreements are common in commercial transactions between businessmen acting at presumed arm's length; and ... there is nothing unconscionable about them. '42 Another court has held that there is nothing
unconscionable about limiting the buyer's remedy to exchanging the
equipment if it is defective and waiving all incidental and consequential
damages.43 Unconscionability will be found in the computer context
under appropriate circumstances, 44 particularly where the clause is bur45
ied in the fine print.
The Code provides little guidance for determining when a limitation or exclusion will be held unconscionable: "Limitation of consequential damages for injury to the person in the case of consumer goods
is prima facie unconscionable but limitation of damages where the loss
is commercial is not."146 Factors to be considered in determining
whether application of a disclaimer would be unconscionable include
the following: (i) whether the contract is a standard form, adhesion
48
contract; 47 (ii) whether the parties had equal bargaining power;
(iii) the relative expertise of the buyer in evaluating the equipment
before its purchase; 49 (iv) any express representations made by the
seller concerning the adequacy or performance of the equipment; 50
(v) whether the disclaimer was conspicuous;5 1 (vi) whether the vendor
should have known of the defect; 2 and (vii) whether the defect was in53
herent in the entire product line.

b. Failureof essential purpose: A separate consideration in evaluating a limitation clause is whether the remedy provided by the clause
has failed of its essential purpose5 4 "Where circumstances cause an exclusive or limited remedy to fail of its essential purpose, remedy may be
42. Id. at 82.
43. Bakal v. Burroughs Corp., 74 Misc. 2d 202, 343 N.Y.S.2d 541 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1972).
44. Burroughs Corp. v. Chesapeake Petroleum & Supply Co., 282 Md. 406, 384 A.2d
734 (1978) (appellate court upheld trial court on the ground that warranty disclaimer was
not part of agreement, but did not reach unconscionability issue).
45. See Jutta's Inc. v. Fireco Equip. Co., 150 N.J. Super. 301, 307, 375 A.2d 687, 690
(1977).
46. U.C.C. § 2-719(3) (1979).
47. See A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 135 Cal. App. 3d 473, 489-93, 186 Cal. Rptr.
114, 123-26 (1982).
48. See id.
49. See id
50. See id.
51. See id.

52. Major v. Kalo Laboratories, Inc., 407 F. Supp. 20, 22-23 (M.D. Ala. 1975).
53. Consolidated Data Terminals v. Applied Digital Data Sys., Inc., 708 F.2d 385 (9th
Cir. 1983).
54. See Chatlos Sys., Inc. v. National Cash Register Co., 479 F. Supp. 738 (D.N.J.
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had as provided by [Article 2 of the U.C.C..

's

For example, where the

remedy is limited to "repair or replacement of defective parts," and the
breach occurred because the system was never delivered, or could never
be made to work according to specifications, that limited remedy would
be found to have "failed of its essential purpose," and all the remedies
56
provided by the U.C.C. would be available to the aggrieved party.
If the limitation on remedies provision fails of its essential purpose,
there remains a question whether a limitation on liability clause in the
same contract would still be effective and preclude the aggrieved party
from availing itself of the damages available under the Code. Some
cases have held that the failure of a limited remedy has no effect on a
limitation of liability clause.5 7 There are, however, strong arguments
for the contrary position, 58 particularly where there is a standard form
contract between parties of unequal bargaining position:
[A] seller who fails to comply with its obligations under the warranty,
such as its repair or replacement duties, cannot receive the benefit of
the other provisions, which in part at least were premised on the assumption that the seller would fulfill its obligations. The failure of the
limited remedy in this case would materially alter the balance of risk
set by the parties in the agreement. In such situations we conclude
that the other limitations and exclusions on the seller's warranties and
liability must also be disregarded and that the59general provisions of the
UCC should govern the rights of the parties.
To guard against this possibility, a smart vendor will always provide
a "back-up" remedy in case its other limited remedies fail of their essential purpose. Such a back-up remedy could be repayment of the
purchase price, or payment of a specified amount or a specified maximum amount. The following is a sample limitation clause with a backup remedy:
[Seller] warrants that this product is free of defects in materials and
workmanship for one year from the date of sale. [Buyer]'s sole and exclusive remedy for breach of this agreement is the repair or replacement of defective parts. If [Seller] is unable to repair the product after
a reasonable number of attempts, [Seller] will provide either a refund
1979), modified, 635 F.2d 1081 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. dismissed, 457 U.S. 1112 (1982); W.R.
Weaver Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 580 S.W.2d 76 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979).
55. U.C.C. § 2-719(2) (1979).
56. See Consolidated Data Terminals v. Applied Digital Data Sys., Inc., 708 F.2d 385
(9th Cir. 1983) (seller's efforts to repair failed to result in performance according to specifications); Chatlos Sys., Inc. v. National Cash Register Co., 479 F. Supp. 738 (D.N.J. 1979),
modified, 635 F.2d 1081 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. dismissed, 457 U.S. 1112 (1982).
57. Chatlos Sys., Inc. v. National Cash Register Co., 479 F. Supp. 738 (D.N.J. 1979),
modified, 635 F.2d 1081 (3d Cir. 1980), cert dismissed, 457 U.S. 1112 (1982); S.M. Wilson &
Co. v. Smith Int'l, Inc., 587 F.2d 1363, 1374 (9th Cir. 1978).
58. See Adams v. J.I. Case Co., 125 111. App. 2d 388, 402-03, 261 N.E.2d 1, 7-8 (1970).
59. Clark v. International Harvester Co., 99 Idaho 326, 581 P.2d 784, 801-02 (1978).

COMPUTER/LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. V

of the monies paid under this Agreement or a replacement unit, at
[Seller's] option. [Seller] shall not in any case be liable for special, incidental or consequential damages arising from breach of warranty,
breach of contract, negligence, or any other legal theory.
4.

Attorneys' Fees Provision

Vendors are normally opposed to including an attorneys' fees provision in their contracts. Seldom will a vendor be suing a user; it is much
more likely litigation will be instituted by the user. Since attorneys'
fees are not recoverable unless provided for by contract,60 the vendor
knows that a disgruntled user will have to absorb its legal costs if the
user decides to sue. In a complicated, hard-fought computer contract
case it is not unusual for each side to spend $30,000 to $50,000 in attorneys' fees just to get the case to trial. Unless the amount in controversy
is significantly in excess of that figure, the prospect of incurring such
costs will deter even the most steadfast user.
5. Shortened Statute of Limitations
Normally, an action for breach of contract must be brought within
the period specified by the statute of limitations of the state whose laws
are to be applied.61 Subject to certain state laws that set a minimum
time period,6 2 this period may be shortened contractually.6 3 The following is typical of a clause having such a purpose: "No action concerning,
related to, or arising out of this Agreement for any breach of or default
under this Agreement, may be commenced more than - years [months]
after the occurrence of any such breach or default."
A shortened period in which to bring an action tends to be of
greater value to the computer vendor, who usually wastes no time in suing the buyer for a breach, that is, for non-payment. The buyer, on the
other hand, may not discover a vendor's breach, such as software with
hidden "bugs," until long after installation, or may attempt to work
with the vendor in curing the problems over an extended period of time
before concluding that the system will never work as promised.64
6.

Choice of Law/Forum Selection

Two other types of clauses that are strategically useful for vendors
are "choice of law" and "forum selection" provisions.
60. E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1717 (West Supp. 1984).
61. 51 AM. JUR. 2D Limitation of Actions § 92 (1970).
62. Eg., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 402.725(1) (West Supp. 1983).

63. Milwaukee v. Northrup Data Sys., Inc., 602 F.2d 767, 769 (7th Cir. 1979); U.C.C.
§ 2-725(1) (1979).
64. See infra text accompanying note 88.
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a. Chzoice of law: Contracts, like all forms of human expredsion,
may be interpreted in many different ways. To insure that a contract
will be interpreted in the vendor's favor, the vendor will use a clause
which specifies that the laws of a particular state shall govern interpretation of the agreement. 65 The following is an example of such a clause:
"This Agreement shall be interpreted, construed, and enforced according to the laws of the State of -.
" Such a provision will be enforced
provided there is a reasonable relationship between the state chosen
67
and the contract, 66 and the clause is not contrary to public policy.

b. Forum selection: Similarly, the vendor can specify in a contract
that any litigation arising out of that contract must be brought in a particular jurisdiction, or even in a particular court. The following is an
example of such a clause: "Any lawsuits arising out of the subject matter of this contract must be filed and prosecuted in the
court
for the County of

, State of

." The advantage to

the vendor is clear. Not only can it get a "hometown advantage," but
the user will be required to locate counsel outside of its geographic area
and incur the considerable expense of long-distance litigation.
II.
A.

LITIGATION
IN GENERAL

When the user believes it has been injured by some action or failure to act by the vendor, it must evaluate the facts that led to the injury
and the extent of the injury suffered. The evaluation must be done
with a clear understanding of the contractual terms defining the vendor's undertaking, and of the costs and benefits to the user in obtaining
relief for the injury suffered.
Unfortunately, most users injured by vendor conduct find either
that the contract is written in such a way that the vendor's failure to
perform as expected does not give rise to any legal claim, or that the
cost of litigating will equal or exceed the potential recovery.
The first situation arises from the one-sided way in which most
vendor contracts are written. The only viable solution to this problem
is to negotiate a more even-handed contract initially.
The second situation arises from the contractual use of limitations
on liability or remedies, 68 or the nature of contract law, which generally
65. See Consolidated Data Terminals v. Applied Digital Data Sys., Inc., 708 F.2d 385
(9th Cir. 1983).
66. U.C.C. § 1-105 (1979); see Duplan Corp. v. W.B. Davis Hosiery Mills, Inc., 442 F.
Supp. 86, 88 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (no relation between state chosen and contract).
67. Pan Am. Computer Corp. v. Data Gen. Corp., 467 F. Supp. 969, 970-71 (D.P.R.
1979).
68. See supra text accompanying notes 34-59.
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limits recovery to actual damages suffered without allowance for attorneys' fees and does not permit the recovery of punitive damages.
While a breach of contract claim is always the starting point in formulating litigation strategy, a user should not overlook the many tort
claims that can be brought in appropriate circumstances. These claims
can be used to overcome both of the obstacles mentioned above, since a
tort action does not arise from the contract and is therefore not limited
by the contractual language, and since tort claims provide an opportunity for a much broader range of damages, including attorneys' fees and
punitive damages. The following sections will outline potential causes
of action a user should consider in evaluating claims it might have
against an errant vendor.
B.

BREACH OF CONTRACT

The plaintiff in a breach of contract action must plead and prove
the following: (i) the existence of a valid contract; (ii) the plaintiff's
performance or excuse for non-performance of the contract; (iii) the defendant's breach; and (iv) the remedies to which the plaintiff is entitled.
1. Plaintiffs Performance or Excuse for Non-Performance
The plaintiff must itself be free from substantial default under the
terms of the contract. The plaintiff must plead and prove performance
or tender of performance or an excuse for non-performance. 69 Valid excuses for a plaintiff's non-performance include prevention by the de71
fendant 70 and waiver by the defendant.
2.

Defendant'sBreach

A breach of contract occurs when there is a wrongful, that is, unjustified and unexcused, failure to perform the terms of the agreement.
Such an actionable breach can include negligent performance of the
contract, failure to perform when performance is due, and refusal to
perform or repudiation of the contract prior to the time performance is
due (anticipatory breach).
In computer contract disputes, it is often difficult for a buyer who is
not a computer expert to establish precisely what actions or omissions
69. Fenn v. Pickwick Corp., 117 Cal. App. 236, 243, 4 P.2d 215, 218-19 (1931).
70. See Schultz v. Los Angeles Dons, 107 Cal. App. 2d 718, 722, 238 P.2d 73, 75 (1951).
But see Diversified Environments, Inc. v. Olivetti Corp., 461 F. Supp. 286, 291-92 (M.D. Pa.

1978) (plaintiff's demand that the computer be removed and training halted held reasonable under the circumstances).
71. Cf. Cohen v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 32 Cal. App. 2d 337, 347, 89 P.2d 732, 738
(1939) (an insured may not rely upon a waiver of a provision of an insurance policy unless
such waiver is pleaded).
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on the part of the defendant caused the breach. The courts generally
permit the buyer to establish the defendant's breach by showing "that
' '7 2
defendant had agreed to produce a result and had failed to do so.
The burden then shifts to the defendant to establish "[t]he reasons for
'73
the failure, if they were of a nature to absolve defendant.
3. Defenses
There are numerous defenses available to a defendant charged with
breach of contract. The most relevant for computer contracts include
(a) waiver, 74 (b) running of the statute of limitations, 75 (c) lack of con-

sideration, 76 (d) unconscionability, 77 (e) the statute of frauds, 78
(f) failure to mitigate damages, 79 and (g) no breach has occurred.
a. Waiver: A buyer must not waive its rights to enforce a contract
the other party has breached. A waiver can occur either by words or by
further performance with knowledge of the breach.8 0 Acceptance of
performance does not constitute a waiver if the breach consists of latent
defects the buyer had no reasonable means of ascertaining prior to acceptance of the computer system. 81
b. Running of the statute of limitations: Normally, an action for
breach of contract must be brought within the period specified by the
statute of limitations of the state whose laws are to be applied.8 2 The
primary purpose of statutes of limitations is to force parties to exercise
their rights of action within a reasonable period of time so that the opposing parties will have a fair opportunity to defend themselves. The
effect of the statutes is to suppress fraudulent and stale claims, which
might otherwise be brought after evidence has been lost and the facts of
the case have been obscured by the passage of time.8 3 "Statutes of limitations are primarily designed to assure fairness to defendants. Such
statutes 'promote justice by preventing surprises through revival of
claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost,
72. Carl Beasley Ford, Inc. v. Burroughs Corp., 361 F. Supp. 325, 331 (E.D. Pa. 1973),
affd, 493 F.2d 1400 (3d Cir. 1974).
73. Id.
74. See infra text accompanying notes 80-81.
75. See infra text accompanying notes 82-88.
76. See infra text accompanying note 89.
77. See infra text accompanying notes 90-105.
78. See infra text accompanying notes 106-14.
79. See infra text accompanying notes 292-94.
80. Leiter v. Eltinge, 246 Cal. App. 2d 306, 317, 54 Cal. Rptr. 703, 711 (1966).
81. See Lovely v. Burroughs Corp., 165 Mont. 209, 216, 527 P.2d 557, 561 (1974).
82. 51 AM. JUR. 2D Limitation of Actions § 92 (1970).
83. Id. § 17.
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memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared.' ",84 The limitation period generally begins to run when the contract is terminated or
when the breach first occurs, whether or not the aggrieved party has
knowledge of the breach. 85 The limitation period may be shortened
87
contractually,8 6 although many states set a minimum time period.
The statute provides an absolute bar to an action, even if the failure
to bring suit within the statutory period was in good faith. In Triangle
Underwriters, Inc. v. Honeywell Information Systems, Inc.,88 a sales
contract for a turnkey computer system was entered into on December
5, 1970, and the system was delivered in January 1971. The computer
never functioned properly and Honeywell personnel tried for over a
year to correct the problems, only to abandon further efforts in 1972.
There was a four-year statute of limitations for breach of a written contract. The court held that the statute began to run as soon as the malfunctioning computer was delivered, and was not tolled by the seller's
efforts to rectify the problems. The breach of contract claim was found
to be time barred, since the action was not filed until 1975-more than
four years after installation.
c. Lack of consideration: One of the elements necessary for an
enforceable contract is consideration. Consideration is defined as a benefit conferred upon the other party or some third person, or a detriment
suffered by the promising party or some third person.8 9 The consideration must have value.
In the computer context, consideration is usually not an issue. The
vendor gives something of value, a computer system or component
thereof, and the buyer gives something of value in return, normally
money. The only area in which the consideration issue is important is
the mass-market software area, where the vendor often attempts to
place restrictions on the uses to which a buyer may put the software
without disclosing those restrictions to the buyer prior to the purchase.
In the case of so-called "shrink wrap" or "box top" licenses, the
buyer purchases a software package, takes it home, opens it, and discovers an inner wrapped package with materials stating that if the buyer
opens the inner package it has agreed to the terms of a restrictive license. If the buyer does not agree to be bound by the terms of the license, it is instructed to return the software unopened to the store or
84. Burnett v. New York Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1965), quoting Order of R.R.
Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1944).
85. U.C.C. § 2-725(2) (1979).
86. See supra text accompanying notes 61-64.
87. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 402.725(1) (West Supp. 1983).
88. 604 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1979).
89. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1605 (West 1982).
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the vendor. Even if the buyer opens the inner package, thereby signaling consent to the terms of the license, the vendor has provided no consideration to the licensee for this new "agreement." Thus, such tactics
have no legal effect.
d. Unconscionability: This defense is normally raised in the face
of an adhesion contract or contract clauses that are contrary to public
policy, such as liability limitations or warranty disclaimers. An "adhesion" contract is one in which the party in the superior bargaining position offers a pre-printed contract on a "take-it-or-leave-it" basis. 90
The term signifies a standardized contract, which, imposed and drafted
by the party of superior bargaining strength, relegates to the subscribing party only the opportunity to adhere to the contract or reject
it ....

Such an agreement does not issue from that freedom in bar-

gaining and equality of bargaining
which are the theoretical parents of
91
the American law of contracts.
In general, more than the use of a standard form contract coupled with
unequal bargaining power must be shown before a court will refuse to
enforce a contract. A party must show that the contract contains harsh
and unconscionable terms and that it would not have agreed to those
92
terms but for its weak bargaining position.
Although the adhesion contract theory is used liberally in interpreting consumer contracts, such as automobile purchase agreements
and insurance policies, it is used less often in commercial contracts since
there is a presumption that the parties to a business agreement are of
relatively equal bargaining power. 9 3 This presumption can be overcome
in appropriate situations, 94 such as where the contract contains terms
that are found to be unconscionable. Under the Uniform Commercial
Code,
If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the
contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court
may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of
the contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the
application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable
90. Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contracts, 43
COLUM. L. REV. 629, 631 (1943).

91. Neal v. State Farm Ins. Cos., 188 Cal. App. 2d 690, 694, 10 Cal. Rptr. 781, 784
(1961).
92. Waggoner v. Dallaire, 649 F.2d 1362, 1367 (9th Cir. 1981).
93. See Bernina Distrib., Inc. v. Bernina Sewing Mach. Co., 646 F.2d 434, 440 (10th Cir.
1981); Gordon v. Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp., 423 F. Supp. 58, 62 (N.D. Ga. 1976), affd,
564 F.2d 413 (5th Cir. 1977).
94. See Jamestown Farmers Elevator, Inc. v. General Mills, Inc., 413 F. Supp. 764, 772
(D.N.D. 1976), rev'd on other grounds, 552 F.2d 1285 (8th Cir. 1977).
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95

result.

The Code does not define "unconscionability," although the official
comment to section 2-302 states:
The basic test [for unconscionability] is whether, in the light of the general commercial background and the commercial needs of the particular trade or case, the clauses involved are so one-sided as to be
unconscionable under the circumstances existing at the time of the
making of the contract ....

The principle is one of the prevention of

oppression and unfair surprise ... and not of96disturbance of allocation
of risks because of superior bargaining power.
Judicial deference to commercial contracts has given rise to a presumption of conscionability. 9 7 An exceptional case is required for the
terms of a commercial computer contract to be found unconscionable. 98
The following types of provisions in commercial contracts have been
found not unconscionable: (i) exclusion of all implied warranties;99
(ii) arbitration to be conducted in the seller's state; 10 0 and
(iii) permission for the creditor to accelerate the balance of the debt in
the event of any default. 10 1 On the other hand, despite the presumption
of conscionability, the following types of provisions in commercial con10 2
tracts have been found unconscionable: (i) a choice of law provision
10 3
where the state bore no reasonable relationship to the transaction;
and (ii) a clause permitting an unreasonably short period of time for
giving notice of defects. Contract provisions placing limitations on liaunconscionable in some cases 10 4 and
bility or remedies have been found
05
not unconscionable in others.'
e. Statute of frauds: The "statute of frauds" is a collective term
that refers to a variety of provisions that deny enforcement of certain
95. U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (1979). This clause has been adopted in California and is applicable to all contracts. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1670.5 (West Supp. 1984).
96. U.C.C. § 2-302 comment 1 (1979) (citations omitted).
97. Earman Oil Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 625 F.2d 1291, 1300 (5th Cir. 1980).
98. See Jamestown Farmers Elevator, Inc. v. General Mills, Inc., 413 F. Supp. 764, 772
(D.N.D. 1976), rev'd on other grounds, 552 F.2d 1285 (8th Cir. 1977); Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Distillers Co., 395 F. Supp. 221, 233 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
99. See Bakal v. Burroughs Corp., 74 Misc. 2d 202, 205, 343 N.Y.S.2d 541, 544 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1972).
100. See Spring Hope Rockwool, Inc. v. Industrial Clean Air, Inc., 504 F. Supp. 1385,
1388-89 (E.D.N.C. 1981).
101. See King v. South Jersey Nat'l Bank, 66 N.J. 161, 169, 330 A.2d 1, 5 (1974).
102. See supra text accompanying notes 65-67.
103. 2 R. ANDERSON, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302:68 (3d ed. 1980).
104. See Burroughs Corp. v. Chesapeake Petroleum & Supply Co., 282 Md. 406, 384
A.2d 734 (1978); see also U.C.C. § 2-719(3) (1979) (limitation of consequential damages for
injury to the person in the case of consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable).
105. See W.R. Weaver Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 580 S.W.2d 76, 82 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979).
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classes of contracts unless they are reduced to writing and signed by the
party to be charged.' 0 6 They are designed as a safeguard against sharp
07
commercial practices.'
The classes of contracts subject to the statute of frauds relevant in
the area of computer contracts include (i) an agreement that by its
terms is not to be performed within a year from its making thereof, 0 8
(ii) a sale of goods with a value of $500 or more, 10 9 and (iii) authority to
enter into a contract required by law to be in writing, the so-called
"equal dignities" doctrine." 0
The writing necessary to satisfy the statute of frauds does not have
to be a contract, but merely a note or memorandum of the terms of an
oral contract, signed by the party to be charged."' The writing may be
informal and may consist of more than one document. 112 All that is required is that the writing reasonably identify the subject matter of the
contract, be sufficient to indicate that a contract with respect thereto
has been made between the parties or offered by the signer to the other
party, and state with reasonable certainty the essential terms of the unperformed promises in the contract." 3 The statute of frauds defense
1 14
will be waived if it is not raised.
4. Remedies
Once it has been determined that a contract has been breached,
there is a spectrum of remedies available to the aggrieved party. These
remedies include damages, 115 attorneys' fees if provided for by contract
or statute," 6 specific performance,"1 7 injunctive relief,"l8 restitution, 1 9
20
and rescission.'
a. Compensatory damages: Damages are intended to place the
non-breaching party in the position it would have been in had the
106. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 110 (1981).
107.
108.
109.
110.

See,
E.g.,
E.g.,
See,

e.g., LTV Aerospace Corp. v. Bateman, 492 S.W.2d 703 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973).
CAL. Civ. CODE § 1024 (West Supp. 1984).
id. § 2309 (West 1954).
e.g., id
111. U.C.C. § 2-201 (1979); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 131 (1981).
112. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 132 (1981).

113. Id. § 133.
114. Id § 138 comment b; U.C.C. § 2-201(1) (1979); Sloan v. Hiatt, 245 Cal. App. 2d 926,
937, 54 Cal. Rptr. 351, 359 (1966).
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

See
See
See
See
See
See

infra text
infra text
infra text
infra text
infra text
infra text

accompanying
accompanying
accompanying
accompanying
accompanying
accompanying

notes
notes
notes
notes
notes
notes

121-51.
152-55.
156-65.
166-72.
173-78.
179-86.
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breaching party fully performed the contract.' 2 ' As in Honeywell, Inc.
v. Lithonia Lighting Co., 1 22 where Honeywell was awarded the net
profit it would have realized had its lessee not wrongfully terminated a
lease, the non-breaching party is awarded the "benefit of the bargain."
Such awards have included the rental cost of computer time on a
machine similar to that which was promised but not supplied, 123 as well
as accelerated payments for the breach of a computer rental
124
agreement.
The benefit of the bargain may be measured by the value to the aggrieved party of the breaching party's performance, plus other losses resulting from the breach. 125 Since the purpose of this remedy is to place
the non-breaching party in the position it would have been in had the
contract been fully performed, the expenses that would have been incurred by the non-breaching party but for the breach (those expenses
saved by the breach) must be subtracted from its losses to arrive at its
126
actual damages.
The "other losses from the breach" that are recoverable include
consequential and incidental damages. 127 These are damages that are a
natural result of the breach. 128 Awards of such damages have included
the loss sustained on the sale of a branch office when a constantly mal129
functioning computer system forced the company to sell the office,
the out-of-pocket expenses incurred by a purchaser in converting to a
new computer system that never worked properly and had to be replaced, 130 and the expenses incurred by a purchaser for a computer sys3
tem that never arrived.' '
To be recoverable, however, contract damages must not only have
been the natural result of the breach, but must also have been reasonably foreseeable by the parties at the time they entered into the con121. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 347 comment a (1981).

122. 317 F. Supp. 406 (N.D. Ga. 1970).
123. Data Probe, Inc. v. 575 Computer Serv., Inc., 72 Misc. 2d 602, 608, 340 N.Y.S.2d 56,
62 (Civ. Ct. 1972).
124. Computer Property Corp. v. Columbia Distrib. Corp., 493 F.2d 953, 955 (4th Cir.
1974).
125. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 347 (1981).
126. Id.; Quad County Distrib. Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 68 Ill. App. 3d 163, 165-66, 385
N.E.2d 1108, 1110 (1979).
127. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 347 (1981); see also U.C.C. § 2-715(2)
(1979) ("consequential damages" are "any loss resulting from general or particular requirements and needs of which the seller at the time of contracting had reason to know,"
and "injury to person or property proximately resulting from any breach of warranty").
128. A.M.R. Enters. v. United Postal Sav. Ass'n, 567 F.2d 1277, 1281 (5th Cir. 1978).
129. See Lovely v. Burroughs Corp., 165 Mont. 209, 216-17, 527 P.2d 557, 561-62 (1974).
130. See Applied Data Processing, Inc. v. Burroughs Corp., 394 F. Supp. 504, 507-08 (D.
Conn. 1975).
131. See United States v. Wegematic Corp., 360 F.2d 674, 675 (2d Cir. 1966).
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tract. 132 If a special loss might occur as the result of a breach, recovery
will be disallowed unless the special circumstances and the probable
cause of the breach were known to the breaching party at the time of
133
contracting.
13 4
Another requirement for recovering damages is certainty of loss.
Losses that are speculative, remote, or conjectural cannot be recovered. 135 The plaintiff must establish the amount of its damages with
reasonable certainty. 136 Such a problem may be avoided by including in
137
the contract a well-drafted liquidated damages provision.
Finally, the plaintiff is under a duty to mitigate damages. No injury that might have been avoided without undue risk may be the basis
of recovery for breach of contract. 138 This does not mean that the nonbreaching party that has attempted in good faith to mitigate its damages
yet has failed will be without a remedy. To the extent that reasonable
139
efforts have been made to avoid the loss, recovery will not be denied.
Failure to mitigate is a defense that can be raised by a breaching party
in an effort to reduce its liability for the breach. The burden is on the
breaching party to prove that the plaintiff failed to mitigate its
140
damages.
b. Punitive damages: Punitive damages are not recoverable for
breach of contract. 141 This is because punitive damages are not intended
to compensate the injured party but to punish the malefactor.1 42 If the
act that caused the breach of contract is also a tort for which punitive
143
damages are available, such damages may be awarded.
132. Vanderbilt Growth Fund, Inc. v. Superior Court, 105 Cal. App. 3d 628, 635 n.6, 164
Cal. Rptr. 621, 625 n.6 (1980); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 351(1) (1981).
133. See T.M. Long Co. v. Jarrett, 165 N.J. Super. 117, 119, 397 A.2d 735, 736 (1979).
134. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 352 (1981).
135. Cardinal Consulting Co. v. Circo Resorts, Inc., 297 N.W.2d 260, 267 (Minn. 1980).
136. Forbes v. Wells Beach Casino, Inc., 409 A.2d 646, 654 (Me. 1979).
137. See infra text accompanying notes 144-51.
138. See Clements Auto Co. v. Service Bureau Corp., 444 F.2d 169, 184-86 (8th Cir.
1971); Chatlos Sys., Inc. v. National Cash Register Co., 479 F. Supp. 738, 746 (D.N.J. 1979),
modified, 635 F.2d 1081 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. dismissed, 457 U.S. 1112 (1982); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 350(1) (1981).
139. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 350(2) (1981).
140. See Diversified Environments, Inc. v. Olivetti Corp., 461 F. Supp. 286, 292 (M.D.
Pa. 1978); Carl Beasley Ford, Inc. v. Burroughs Corp., 361 F. Supp. 325, 335 (E.D. Pa.
1973), affd, 493 F.2d 1400 (3d Cir. 1974).
141.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 355 (1981).

142. City
143. Life
granted, 651
(SECOND) OF

of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 266-67 (1981).
Ins. Co. of Va. v. Murry Inv. Co., 646 F.2d 224, 228 (5th Cir. 1981), rehg
F.2d 1090 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1981); RESTATEMENT
CONTRACTS § 355 (1981).
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c. Liquidated damages: Liquidated damages, once looked upon
with judicial disfavor, are now generally accepted as a legitimate technique to allocate the consequences of a breach of contract before it occurs. 144 Under this damage theory, the parties agree at the time of

contracting how much should be paid in damages if there is a breach
1 45
resulting in injury or loss.

If the amount fixed by the contract is found to be unreasonably
large, it will be considered a penalty and the liquidated damages provision will not be enforced. 146 To make that determination, the court will
look at two factors. First, the court will look to whether the amount
fixed in the contract was reasonable to the extent that it approximated
either the actual loss that occurred upon the breach or the loss reasonably anticipated by the parties at the time they entered into the contract.1 47 If the amount fixed is plainly or grossly disproportionate to the
loss that was probable in light of the circumstances that existed when
the contract was made, the provision will be considered a penalty and
not be enforced.

1 48

The second factor the court will consider is the difficulty of proving
a loss. The greater the difficulty of either proving that a loss has occurred or establishing the amount of the loss with the requisite certainty, the easier it is to demonstrate the reasonableness of the
liquidated amount.

149

Liquidated damages clauses are often appropriate in computer acquisition or lease contracts. 1 50 Loss to the purchaser or lessee from late
delivery, a faulty system, or non-delivery is difficult to determine with
certainty since computers, in contrast with production equipment, do
not produce discrete, measurable units. Instead, they are often involved
in the functioning, management, and efficiency of the business as a
whole. It is difficult, if not impossible, to fix with certainty the amount
of damages sustained because a business did not achieve the greater efficiency promised by a vendor.
In United States v. Wegematic Corp.,151 the defendant was unable
to supply the promised computer. In addition to awarding the addi144. See Jennie-O Foods, Inc. v. United States, 580 F.2d 400, 412 (Ct. Cl. 1978).

145. Truck Rent-A-Center, Inc. v. Puritan Farms 2nd, Inc., 41 N.Y.2d 420, 424, 361
N.E.2d 1015, 1018, 393 N.Y.S.2d 365, 368 (1977).
146. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356 (1981).
147. Id. comment b.
148. Truck Rent-A-Center, Inc. v. Puritan Farms 2nd, Inc., 41 N.Y.2d 420, 424, 361
N.E.2d 1015, 1018, 393 N.Y.S.2d 365, 369 (1977).
149. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356 comment b (1981).
150. Computer Property Corp. v. Columbia Distrib. Corp., 5 Computer L. Serv. Rep.
(Callaghan) 524, 530 (D.S.C. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 493 F.2d 953, 955 (4th Cir.
1974).
151. 360 F.2d 674 (2d Cir. 1966).
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tional costs incurred by the government in procuring a replacement
machine, the court awarded damages based on a liquidated damage
clause calling for $100 per day for delay in delivery.
d. Attorneys' fees: Litigants must pay their own attorneys' fees
unless such an award is authorized by statute or provided for by contract.152 Where attorneys' fees are provided for, determination of the
reasonableness of the fees is a matter for the court's discretion. Once
that determination has been made, an appellate court will interfere
5 3
only where there has been a manifest abuse of discretion.1
Drafting contracts with attorneys' fees provisions requires some
caution. Many states provide by statute that if a contract awards attorneys' fees to one party if that party prevails at trial, then attorneys' fees
will be awarded to the prevailing party, no matter which party
prevails. 5 4 Such statutes are enacted to "eliminate the unfairness of
unilateral provisions for attorney's fees by making their enforcement
1 55

reciprocal."'

e. Specific performance: Specific performance is an alternative
remedy to an award of money damages for breach of contract' 5 6 This
remedy is designed to produce the same effect that performance of the
of a court order to the
contract would have produced. It consists
57
promised.
as
perform
to
party
breaching
A prerequisite to an award of specific performance is the existence
of a valid contract with specific and distinct terms.'5 8 The specificity of
the contract is extremely important. 1 59 The operative terms of the contract must be of sufficient clarity that the court can order the performance of the specific act for which the parties contracted. 1 60 Although it
has been held that a greater degree of certainty of contract terms is required for specific performance than for money damages, 161 a contract
152. See, e.g., Computer Property Corp. v. Columbia Distrib. Corp., 5 Computer L.

Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 524, 530 (D.S.C. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 493 F.2d 953, 955
(4th Cir. 1974); Bauguess v. Paine, 22 Cal. 3d 626, 634, 150 Cal. Rptr. 461, 465, 586 P.2d 942,
946 (1978).
153. Walters v. Marler, 83 Cal. App. 3d 1, 36, 147 Cal. Rptr. 655, 677 (1978).
154. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1717(a) (West Supp. 1984).
155. Boliver v. Surety Co. of the Pacific, 72 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 22, 28, 140 Cal. Rptr.
259, 263 (1977).
156. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 357(1) (1981).
157. Id. comment a.
158. Bonk v. Boyajian, 128 Cal. App. 2d 153, 155, 274 P.2d 948, 950 (1954).
159. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 362 (1981).
160. Chicago Inv. Corp. v. Dolins, 93 Ill. App. 3d 971, 974, 418 N.E.2d 59, 62 (1981).
161. See Yackey v. Pacifica Dev. Co., 99 Cal. App. 3d 776, 784, 160 Cal. Rptr. 430, 434
(1979).
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is not too uncertain to be specifically enforced merely because the
16 2
promisor is given a choice of performing in several ways.
Specific performance will be ordered only if there is no adequate
monetary remedy.163 Factors affecting the adequacy of monetary damages include the difficulty of proving damages with certainty, 16 4 and the
difficulty of obtaining a suitable substitute performance with money
1 65
awarded as damages, such as where the goods or services are unique.
f. Injunctive relief. A court may order an injunction against a
party who has committed or who has threatened to commit a breach of
contract.166 The injunction directs the breaching party to refrain from
doing the specified act. If the contract requires forbearance, the injunction, in effect, will order specific performance. 167 If the contract calls
for an act, the injunction will provide enforcement indirectly by forbid168
ding behavior inconsistent with the terms of the contract.
Relief by injunction is subject to most of the requirements for and
limitations on specific performance: (i) damages must be inadequate to
compensate the non-breaching party for the breach; 169 (ii) the terms of
the contract must be sufficiently certain to provide a basis for the decree;170 and (iii) granting the injunction must not be unfair or contrary
71
to public policy.'
Despite these limitations on injunctive relief, an injunction can provide relief not available by specific performance. While personal service
contracts cannot be specifically enforced where the services are unique,
an injunction may be granted precluding the employee from taking
other employment. 172 Thus, a "star" programmer under contract with a
software company, who provides unique and irreplaceable services, can
be prevented from breaching that contract and going to work for a competitor during the remaining term of the contract. Enforcement of covenants not to compete with a former employer after the term of
employment, however, is another matter, beyond the scope of this
Article.
162. Botticello v. Stefanovicz, 177 Conn. 22, 31, 411 A.2d 16, 21 (1979).
163. Guinness-Harp Corp. v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 613 F.2d 468, 473 (2d Cir. 1980);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 359(1) (1981).
164. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 360(a) (1981).
165. Id. § 360(b).
166. Id. § 357(2).
167. See supra text accompanying notes 156-65.

§ 357 comment b (1981).
Id. § 359.
Id § 362.
Id. §§ 364-365.
Evening News Ass'n v. Peterson, 477 F. Supp. 77, 82 (D.D.C. 1979); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 367(2) (1981).
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
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Injunctions are useful to halt acts that constitute breach of contract
in the areas of supplier, distributor, and dealer contracts as well.
g. Restitution: The user, instead of receiving damages, may be entitled to restoration of any benefits conferred upon the breaching vendor. 173 Restitution does not involve enforcing the other party's
promises; its purpose is to prevent unjust enrichment of the breaching
party.174
Where the non-breaching party has conferred money upon the
party in breach, such as where it pays a rental deposit on a computer
that is never delivered,175 the measure of restitution is the amount paid
to the breaching party. Where the non-breaching party has provided
goods or services, the award is measured by either the value of the
goods or services to the breaching party, that is, what the breaching
party would have had to pay a third party to obtain similar goods or
services, or the extent to which the breaching party's property or other
interests have increased in value due to the goods provided or services
rendered.

176

Restitution, unlike some other remedies, is available even if the
contract is unenforceable due to the statute of frauds. 17 7 In addition, a
party who has avoided a contract on the grounds of lack of capacity,
mistake, misrepresentation, duress, undue influence, or abuse of a fiduciary relationship is entitled to restitution of any benefits conferred
upon the other party.

1 78

h. Rescission: Where a breach of contract is material and wilful,
or so fundamental and substantial as to defeat the object of the contract, the non-breaching party may be allowed to rescind the contract.1 79 Rescission is not available for mere variances from the terms
of a contract, but only where there is a substantial breach or where
money damages would be inadequate.18 0
Rescission results in termination of the contract and return of the
parties to the position they were in before the contract ("status quo
ante"). 8L ' Because the parties must be restored, as far as possible, to
173. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
174. Id. comment a.

OF CONTRACTS

§ 373(1) (1981).

175. See J. Dirats & Co. v. National Cash Register Co., 5 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Cal-

laghan) 1295 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 1973).
176. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

§ 371

(1981).

177. Id. § 375.
178. Id. § 376.
179. Canfield v. Reynolds, 631 F.2d 169, 178 (2d Cir. 1980).
180. Joyce v. Davis, 539 F.2d 1262, 1265-66 (10th Cir. 1976).
181. See American Gen. Ins. Co. v. Equitable Gen. Corp., 493 F. Supp. 721, 756 (E.D.
Va. 1980).
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182
the economic position they occupied prior to entry into the contract,
the party seeking rescission must restore or offer to restore to the other
party all consideration received pursuant to the contract. 183 The rule of
total restoration does not apply, however, where the breaching party
has made such restoration impossible.'84
In some states, one can sue for both rescission and damages. 185 In
those states it is also possible to avoid limitations on consequential
86
damages.

C.

NEGLIGENCE

A key reason for the success of computers in the marketplace is
their ability to perform a variety of tasks. Depending on the scope of a
particular task, a computer normally can be assembled from a wide variety of readily available hardware and software components to perform
that task. This "general purpose" characteristic has allowed mass-production of key computer components. As a result, the price of computer systems has been lowered to the point that almost every type of
business and government entity, as well as numerous individuals, can
afford to buy powerful computer systems.
This general purpose characteristic, however, provides users with
ample opportunities to apply negligence law where a computer has been
negligently built, programmed, or installed. The elements necessary for
a claim of negligence are (i) the existence of a duty on the part of the
defendant to protect the plaintiff from injury, (ii) breach of that duty by
action or omission to act, (iii) a causal connection between the breach
187
and plaintiff's injury, and (iv) actual loss or damage.
The standard of negligence is the exercise of ordinary or reasonable
care, or the conduct of an ordinarily or reasonably prudent person in
like circumstances.' 8 8 The general, objective standard gauges a person's
acts against those of the "reasonably prudent man"-a hypothetical person. 189 The amount of care and the kind of conduct required will vary
with the circumstances, but the standard of care, that is, what the rea182.
183.
1978).
184.
185.

McCoy v. West, 70 Cal. App. 3d 295, 302, 138 Cal. Rptr. 660, 664 (1977).
Jones v. CPR Div., Upjohn Co., 120 Ariz. 147, 151, 584 P.2d 611, 615 (Ct. App.
See Robison v. Katz, 94 N.M. 314, 318, 610 P.2d 201, 206-07 (Ct. App. 1980).
See, e.g., Sperry Rand Corp. v. Industrial Supply Corp., 337 F.2d 363 (5th Cir.

1964); CAL. CIv. CODE § 1692 (West 1973).

186. See Morris v. Chevrolet Motor Div. of Gen. Motors Corp., 39 Cal. App. 3d 917, 92425, 114 Cal. Rptr. 747, 752 (1974).
187. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 143 (4th ed. 1971).
188. Law v. Shoate, 178 Cal. App. 2d 739, 742, 3 Cal. Rptr. 274, 275-76 (1960); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 (1965).
189. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 comment b (1965).
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sonably prudent man would do under the circumstances, does not
190
change.
Privity of contract is not necessary to recover damages for negligent
acts. 191 Thus, despite the fact that they are not parties to any contract
with the defendant, third parties injured by negligent acts of the defendant can recover damages, so long as all of the elements of negligence are established.
1.

Duty of Due Care

Before liability can be imposed, a duty of due care must exist between the defendant and the injured party. Generally, a defendant
owes a duty of care to all persons who are foreseeably endangered by
his conduct.
2. Breach of Duty
Once it has been shown that the defendant owed a duty of due care
to the plaintiff, it is then necessary to show that the defendant breached
that duty by an act or omission that exposed the plaintiff to an unreasonable risk of harm, that is, that the defendant acted negligently. 192
3.

Causation

Causation is established by a two-pronged test. First, the defendant's negligence must have been the cause-in-fact of the plaintiff's injury. Cause-in-fact is proven by showing that "but for" defendant's
negligence, the injury would not have occurred, 193 or that the negli194
gence was a substantial factor in bringing about the injury.
Second, the defendant's conduct must have been the proximate (or
legal) cause of the injury. That is, the plaintiff's damages must have
been a foreseeable result of the defendant's negligent act. 195 Foreseeability serves as a limitation on the amount and nature of damages that
can be recovered for negligence.
4. Damages
A plaintiff is entitled to recover all damages proximately caused by
a defendant's negligence. These include personal injuries, 196 property
190. See id § 296(1).
191. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 389, 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (1916).
192. Weirum v. RKO Gen., Inc., 15 Cal. 3d 40, 47-48, 539 P.2d 36, 40, 123 Cal. Rptr. 468,
472 (1975).
193. Godwin v. LaTurco, 272 Cal. App. 2d 475, 479, 77 Cal. Rptr. 305, 308 (1969).
194. McDonald v. Schwartz, 239 Cal. App. 2d 900, 905-06, 49 Cal. Rptr. 242, 246 (1966).
195. Evans v. Thomason, 72 Cal. App. 3d 978, 983, 140 Cal. Rptr. 525, 528 (1977).
196. See Martin v. United States, 471 F. Supp. 6 (D. Ariz. 1979).
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damage, 197 and in some states, pure economic losses. 98s Punitive damages are not recoverable. 199
It is not necessary for a defendant to anticipate every possible scenario under which someone might be injured. "It would be totally unreasonable to require that a manufacturer warn or protect against every
injury which may ensue from mishap in the use of his product. '200 The
limitation placed on damage recovery by the foreseeability requirement
can be extremely important in the computer context, where the hardware, and often the software, are specifically designed to be "general
purpose." General purpose computer systems are designed to perform a
variety of tasks, many of which may not have been envisioned by the
creator. It may reasonably be argued that it is foreseeable that accounting software could cause certain damages to a business, such lost profits
and even lost customers, if it were defective. It stretches credulity,
however, to argue that it would be reasonably foreseeable to the developer of a word processing package that a defect in the package could
if used to develop a procedure mancause billions of dollars in damages
201
ual for a nuclear power plant.
Contributory or comparative negligence of the plaintiff or of other
defendants may reduce or eliminate the damages assessed against any
individual defendant. 20 2 In addition, the plaintiff has a duty to act reato mitigate its damages, the adsonably to minimize its loss. 20 3 If it fails
20 4
ditional damages are not recoverable.
5.

Negligent Breach of Contract

Negligence is a tort. Although it is
tract, negligent conduct may constitute a
ence of a valid contract, however, may
claim, but may totally preclude it. One
negligent manner may be held liable to
197.
(1979).
198.
199.
200.

a wrong independent of conbreach of contract. The presnot only affect a negligence
who performs a contract in a
the other party for breach of

See George A. Hormel & Co. v. Maez, 92 Cal. App. 3d 963, 155 Cal. Rptr. 337
See J'aire Corp. v. Gregory, 24 Cal. 3d 799, 598 P.2d 60, 157 Cal. Rptr. 407 (1979).
Milwaukee & St. Paul R.R. v. Arms, 91 U.S. 489 (1875).
Borowicz v. Chicago Mastic Co., 367 F.2d 751, 760 (7th Cir. 1966); accord Perrine v.

Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 186 Cal. App. 2d 442, 449, 9 Cal. Rptr. 45, 49 (1960). But see

George A. Hormel & Co. v. Maez, 92 Cal. App. 3d 963, 155 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1979) (driver of
car that hit utility pole held liable for damages to nearby business resulting from a power
surge).
201. See generally Jordan, The Tortious Computer-When Does EDP Become Errant
Data Processing?,4 COMPUTER L. SERV. (CALLAGHAN) § 5-1, art. 2, at 10 (1979).
202. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 463 (1965); see also Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13

Cal. 3d 804, 828, 532 P.2d 1266, 1283, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858, 875 (1975).
203. Withrow v. Becker, 6 Cal. App. 2d 723, 730, 45 P.2d 235, 239 (1935).
204. Id.

1985]

COMMERCIAL USER-VENDOR LITIGATION

contract, but generally not for negligence. 20 5 One whose conduct would
be actionable as negligence, however, can be found liable irrespective of
the existence of a valid contract. 20 6 This fact is extremely important,
since the damages recoverable under a tort theory are potentially
greater than those recoverable for breach of contract, 20 7 particularly
since most computer contracts contain integration clauses, 208 warranty
exclusions, 20 9 and limitation of liability provisions.2 10
D.

STRICT LIABILITY

A manufacturer, distributor, or retailer can be held strictly liable in
tort, that is, liable without fault, when a product placed on the market
with the knowledge that it will be used without inspection for defects
has a defect that causes injury to person or property.2 11 This is true no
matter who in the marketing chain created the defect, 212 and applies

2 13
not only to defects in manufacturing, but to defects in design as well.
Indeed, a company that merely assembles components manufactured by
others can be held strictly liable for a defect in one of those
214
components.
Liability without fault is imposed in cases of defective products for
a number of reasons, including (i) a societal decision to shift the burden
of loss to the manufacturer and distributor of the product, since they
are better able to insure against the loss than the individual con-

205. See Burroughs Corp. v. Chesapeake Petroleum & Supply Co., 282 Md. 406, 409, 384
A.2d 734, 736 (1978) (negligence claim dismissed since no duty independent of the contract); Datamark, Inc., ASBCA 12767, 2 Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 79, 82-83
(1969) (where Air Force contractor miswired computer, court held that lawsuit, even if
labeled as one for negligence, was actually one for breach of contract).

206. See 5 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS 119 (1964). See also Triangle Underwriters, Inc. v. Honeywell Information Sys., Inc., 457 F. Supp. 765, 771 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), modi-

fied, 604 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1979) (negligence claim recognized but held barred by statute of
limitations).

207. See supra text accompanying notes 121-51.
208. See supra text accompanying notes 8-13.
209. See supra text accompanying notes 14-33.
210. See supra text accompanying notes 34-39.
211. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
212. Id.; Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 260-61, 391 P.2d 168, 170-71, 37
Cal. Rptr. 896, 898-99 (1964) (retailer); Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d
57, 62, 377 P.2d 897, 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 700 (1963) (manufacturer); Barth v. B.F. Goodrich Tire Co., 265 Cal. App. 2d 228, 250, 71 Cal. Rptr. 306, 319 (1968) (distributor); Canifax
v. Hercules Powder Co., 237 Cal. App. 2d 44, 52, 46 Cal. Rptr. 552, 557 (1965) (wholesaler).
213. See Miller v. Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist., 8 Cal. 3d 689, 703, 505 P.2d
193, 202-03, 106 Cal. Rptr. 1, 10-11 (1973).
214. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 400 (1965).
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sumer;215 (ii) a belief that if held liable, the manufacturer will use more
care in the future; 216 and (iii) a realization that as products become
more complex, it becomes increasingly difficult to prove manufacturers'
217
negligence.
The elements of a strict liability claim are as follows: (i) the product had a defect when sold or leased to the customer; 218 (ii) the product
was being used in a normal, intended, or reasonably foreseeable manner
when it caused the injury; 219 and (iii) the defect was the proximate
cause of the injury. 220 As these elements indicate, while liability is
22
strict, it is not absolute. '
There is no requirement of privity of contract for strict liability to
arise.222 The plaintiff need not be the purchaser or user of the product
but may be anyone to whom an injury is reasonably foreseeable. 223 For
example, a hospital patient could sue the manufacturer of a computerized CAT scanner for a defect that caused him injury, despite the fact
that the patient was neither the purchaser nor the user of the scanner.
There are two basic kinds of product defects that can give rise to
strict liability. First, there are manufacturing defects-those where the
resultant product deviates from the manufacturer's intended result.
Second, there are design defects-those where either (i) the product
fails to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect, or
(ii) the risk inherent in the product's design outweighs the benefits of
22 4
the design.
The plaintiff has the burden of proving the existence of a manufacturing defect, or that the design falls short of the expectations of an ordinary consumer. Once the plaintiff proves that the design proximately
caused his injury, the burden shifts to the defendant to show that the
22 5
benefit of the design outweighs its risks.
215. See Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69

YALE L.J. 1099, 1120-22 (1960).
216. See Woody v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 463 F. Supp. 817, 821 (E.D. Tenn. 1978).
217. See La Rossa v. Scientific Design Co., 402 F.2d 937, 942 (3d Cir. 1968).
218. See Miller v. Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist., 8 Cal. 3d 689, 505 P.2d 193,
106 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1973).
219. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr.
697 (1963).
220. See Miller, 8 Cal. 3d 689.
221. See Kerr v. Corning Glass Co., 284 Minn. 115, 117, 169 N.W.2d 587, 589 (1969).
222. Piercefield v. Remington Arms Co., 375 Mich. 85, 98, 133 N.W.2d 129, 135 (1965).
223. Silverhart v. Mount Zion Hosp., 20 Cal. App. 3d 1022, 1026, 98 Cal. Rptr. 187, 189
(1971).
224. See Barker v. Lull Eng'r Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 429-34, 573 P.2d 443, 453-56, 143 Cal.
Rptr. 225, 235-39 (1978).
225. See id.
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1.

Damages

It is universally accepted that plaintiffs are entitled to recover for
personal injuries and property damage suffered as a result of a product
defect. 226 There is also some authority for extending coverage to purely
commercial economic injury. 227 Since strict liability sounds in tort, disclaimers of liability are enforced less readily in strict liability cases than
228
in contract actions.
2.

Applicability to Software

Strict liability does not apply to services 229 or to defective products
230
that are only incidental to the rendering of professional services.
While this limitation will have no effect on claims for injuries arising
from defective hardware, it will create problems if and when injured
parties attempt to use the doctrine to recover damages caused by defective software, particularly custom developed software. As stated in La
Rossa v. Scientific Design Co. 231:
Professional services do not ordinarily lend themselves to the doctrine
of tort liability without fault because they lack the elements which
gave rise to the doctrine. There is no mass production of goods or a
large body of distant consumers whom it would be unfair to require to
trace the article they used along the channels of trade to the original
manufacturer and there to pinpoint an act of negligence remote from
their knowledge and even from their ability to inquire. Thus, professional services form a marked contrast to consumer products cases and
even in those jurisdictions which have adopted a rule of strict products
liability a majority of decisions have declined to apply it to professional
2
services.

23

Thus, to the extent that a software programmer or consultant is
considered to be rendering a service rather than selling a product, there
can be no strict liability for defects in the software. 233 Strict liability
226. Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 18, 403 P.2d 145, 151, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 23
(1965).
227. See id.
228. See Mid Continent Aircraft Corp. v. Curry County Spraying Serv., Inc., 572
S.W.2d 308, 310 (Tex. 1978). But see Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 238 Cal.
App. 2d 95, 100, 47 Cal. Rptr. 518, 521 (1965) (disclaimer of strict liability in commercial
contracts between parties of equal bargaining power effective against claims of property
damages).
229. Allied Properties v. John A. Blume & Assoc., 25 Cal. App. 3d 848, 855, 102 Cal.
Rptr. 259, 264 (1972); W. KIMBLE & R. LESCHER, PRODUCTS LIABILrY § 1 (1979).

230.
231.
232.
233.
(1977).

Magrine v. Spector, 100 N.J. Super. 223, 241 A.2d 637 (1968).
402 F.2d 937 (3d Cir. 1968).
Id at 942-43 (footnotes and citations omitted).
See Freed, Products Liability in the Computer Age, 17 JURIMETRICS J. 270, 275-79
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does, however, appear applicable to software that is licensed without
significant modification as a standard packaged system. 23 4 This is because the vendor, the "manufacturer" of the software, is in a better economic position than the vendee to bear the risk and spread the costs of
235
injury caused by errors in the software.
3.

Indemnification and Disclaimers

Although all entities in the marketing chain are liable to an injured
party for a product defect, those who are not at fault are entitled to indemnification from those ultimately liable. 23 6 Principles of comparative
negligence apply to actions for strict product liability if the doctrine is
237
followed in the applicable state.

E.

PROFESSIONAL MALPRACTICE

Not everyone can be held liable for professional negligence (malpractice). A professional or skilled craftsman is one who has "a special
form of competence which is not shared by the average reasonable man,
but which is the result of acquired learning and aptitude and is devel'238
oped by special training and experience.
The general rule is that professionals have "a duty to exercise the
ordinary skill and competence of members of their profession. '239 This
rule sets a minimum duty that professionals owe to the general public
when acting in their professional capacities. 240 It is not enough for a
professional to meet the general negligence standard, under which the
actor is judged by the reasonable man test. A professional must make
such inquiries as are necessary to reach a professional judgment that is
a "considered conclusion.1 241 Despite this heightened standard, the professional is not a guarantor of results, particularly in new and unsettled
areas. 242 While the duty of a professional is greater than that of a reasonable man, the scope of that obligation is more narrow than in the
case of ordinary negligence. Professionals can be held liable only to
234. See Brannigan & Dayhoff, Liability for Personal Injuries Caused by Defective

Medical Computer Programs,7 AM. J.L. & MED. 122, 132-33 (1981).
235. Id. at 133.
236. Bendix-Westinghouse Auto. Air Brake Co. v. Latrobe Die Casting Co., 427 F.
Supp. 34, 39 (D. Colo. 1976).
237. See, e.g., Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 742, 575 P.2d 1162, 1172, 144
Cal. Rptr. 380, 390 (1978).
238. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A comment a (1965).
239. Gagne v. Bertran, 43 Cal. 2d 481, 489, 275 P.2d 15, 21 (1954).
240. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A (1965).
241. Ramp v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 254 So. 2d 79, 82 (La. Ct. App. 1971).
242.

(1981).

Brooks, Tort and Malpractice Liability, 2 U.S.C. COMPUTER L. INST. § XIII, at 35
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their clients and to foreseeably affected third parties who were to be
243
the primary beneficiaries of their services.
Whether computer designers or programmers are professionals in
the legal sense is still an open question. 244 Any determination in this
area is extremely difficult, since "the distinction between professional
and nonprofessional services is often vague." 245 In Pezzillo v. General
Telephone & Electric Information Systems, Inc.,246 the court held that
computer programmers are not employed in a "professional capacity" as
that term is used in the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938.247 The court
analogized the duties performed by computer programmers to those of a
draftsman employed by an architect, stating that both the draftsman
and the programmer generally perform mechanical functions, while architects and computer analysts generally act as professionals. Department of Labor regulations state that programmers and systems analysts
are not professionals under the Fair Labor Standards Act, since "[a]t
the present time there is too great a variation in standards and academic requirements to conclude that employees employed in such occupations are a part of a true profession recognized as such by the
academic community with universally accepted standards for employ'248
ment in the field.
F.

FRAUD

Fraud is a common law tort applicable to several different degrees
of culpable conduct: intentional misrepresentations, negligent misrepresentations, and innocent misrepresentations. Since fraud claims usually arise from intentional misrepresentations, such misrepresentations
will be focused on here.
The elements of a fraud claim are (i) false misrepresentation of a
past or present material fact by the defendant, (ii) knowledge or belief
by the defendant that the representation is false ("scienter"), (iii) intent
243. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 187-89, 174 N.E. 441, 447-48 (1931);
White v. Guarente, 43 N.Y.2d 356, 361-62, 372 N.E.2d 315, 318-19, 401 N.Y.S.2d 474, 477-78
(1977) (expanded Ultramaresrule to cover a foreseeable class of persons).

244. See Chatlos Sys., Inc. v. National Cash Register Co., 479 F. Supp. 738, 740-41 n.1
(D.N.J. 1979), modified, 635 F.2d 1081 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. dismissed, 457 U.S. 1112 (1982)
(court refused to apply a "computer malpractice" theory "in the absence of sound precedential authority"); Triangle Underwriters, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 457 F. Supp. 765, 771

(E.D.N.Y. 1978), modified, 604 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1979) (court refused to apply the "continuous tort theory" of professional malpractice law). See generally Brooks, supra note 242, at

35.
245. Johnson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 355 F. Supp. 1065, 1067 (E.D. Wis. 1973).
246. 414 F. Supp. 1257, 1270 (M.D. Tenn. 1976), affd per curiam, 572 F.2d 1189 (6th
Cir. 1978).
247. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1982).
248. 29 C.F.R. § 541.302(h) (1983).
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that the plaintiff rely on the misrepresentation, (iv) justifiable reliance
by the plaintiff on the misrepresentation, and (v) damages resulting
therefrom. 24 9 In addition, most jurisdictions require that fraud claims
be pleaded with particularity 250 and proven either by a "fair preponderance of the evidence" 25 1 or "clear and convincing evidence. '252 While
this burden of proof may be difficult to meet in many cases, under California law the immediate failure to perform a promise can justify an in25 3
ference of fraud.
1. Misrepresentations
To be actionable the representations must be statements of past or
present fact and not merely opinions, salesman's "puffing," or predictions of probable future events.254 In Strand v. Librascope, Inc.,255 the
court went so far as to hold that since the defendant held itself out as
an expert, its statements, even if meant to be opinions, would be actionable since "[u]nder the circumstances, it was reasonable for Strand to
rely upon Librascope's statement as representations of facts which were
not inconsistent with the expressed opinions. '256 Statements made by
employees with actual or apparent authority in the course of their employment are binding on the employer even if the employees were not
2 57
expressly authorized to make such statements.
Actionable misrepresentations have included the following
statements:
control system is to automate
1. The only way to obtain an inventory
258
the entire accounting system.
are ade2. There are controls built into the computer system that
259
quate to prevent any but a minimal number of errors.
3. "This program will provide iron-clad controls to insure accurate
reports."

260

249. W. PROSSER, supra note 187, at 685-86. See also Glovatorium, Inc. v. NCR Corp.,
684 F.2d 658, 660 (9th Cir. 1982) (California law); Clements Auto Co. v. Service Bureau
Corp., 444 F.2d 169, 175 (8th Cir. 1971), affg 298 F. Supp. 115 (D. Minn. 1969) (scienter not
a required element of fraud under Minnesota law).
250. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
251. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 115 (West 1966).
252. See 9 J. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE 424 n.13 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1981).
253. See Glovatorium, Inc. v. NCR Corp., 684 F.2d 658, 661 (9th Cir. 1982).
254. See, e.g., Clements Auto Co. v. Service Bureau Corp., 444 F.2d 169 (8th Cir. 1971),
affg 298 F. Supp. 115 (D. Minn. 1969).
255. 197 F. Supp. 743 (E.D. Mich. 1961).
256. Id. at 754.
257. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 265 (1958); Librascope, 197 F. Supp. at 755.
258. Clements Auto Co. v. Service Bureau Corp., 444 F.2d 169 (8th Cir. 1971), affg 298
F. Supp. 115 (D. Minn. 1969).
259. Id.
260. I1&
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4.

The input devices, if operated by normal clerical personnel, could
efficiently produce the input necessary for the data processing
61
system.

5.

6.

The weekly sales reports would allow "management by exception,"
that is, management would have to concern itself only with what
was unusual or different and not with a mass of repetitive
262
details.
Components would meet certain specifications, when they would
3
not.

2.

2

26

Scienter

A majority of states require that false statements be made with
knowledge of their falsity ("scienter") before constituting actionable
fraud. 2 6 4 Scienter can be proven by showing either that the defendant
had actual knowledge of the falsity of his representations, or the defendant "lacked an honest belief in their truth, or that the statements
were carelessly and recklessly made, in a manner not warranted by the
' 26 5
information available to defendant.
In Dunn Appraisal Co. v. Honeywell Information Systems, Inc.,266
scienter was established where an eager salesman's failure to reveal
substantial doubts whether programs owned by the buyer could be used
on a new computer was found to be "willful disregard of the truth."
The appellate court affirmed an award of over $120,000 against Honeywell on the fraud claim, which included compensatory and punitive
damages as well as attorneys' fees.
A number of states, however, do not have the scienter requirement.
In Clements Auto Co. v. Service Bureau Corp. 267 the court, applying
Minnesota law, stated:
There is no proof that anyone at SBC knew this statement was false
when it was uttered, but deliberate deception or scienter is not a necessary element of a cause of action for fraud in Minnesota. It is sufficient
if the speaker makes the statement as of his own knowledge without
knowing whether it is true or false. Under Minnesota law an unquali268
fied affirmation amounts to an affirmation of one's own knowledge.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Librascope, 197 F. Supp. 743.
264. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1572-1573 (West 1973). See generally Note, Imposing
Liability on Data ProcessingServices-Should CaliforniaChoose Fraudor Warranty?,13
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 140, 145-47 (1972).

265. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 526 (1977), quoted in Wishnick v. Frye, 111
Cal. App. 2d 926, 930, 245 P.2d 532, 535 (1952).
266. 687 F.2d 877 (6th Cir. 1982).
267. 298 F. Supp. 115 (D. Minn. 1969), affd, 444 F.2d 169 (8th Cir. 1971).
268. Id. at 126. See also Strand v. Librascope, Inc., 197 F. Supp. 743 (E.D. Mich. 1961)
(applying Michigan law).
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California law provides for another form of fraud that does not require scienter--deceit or negligent misrepresentation. 26 9 Under this
theory the intent required is merely an "intent to induce action," which
exists whenever the defendant knows that the plaintiff is likely to rely
2 70
on his representations.
3.

Justifiable Reliance

Fraudulent representations are actionable only if they are detrimentally relied upon by the plaintiff. If there was no reliance, then the
statements, even if fraudulent, could not have caused the plaintiff any
damages. 2 71 In addition, this reliance must have been justified under
272
the circumstances.
The plaintiff can usually carry its burden of proof on this issue simply by showing that it entered into the contract after the representations were made, and that the defendant had superior knowledge
concerning the particular products or services that are the subject of
the transaction. 273 There can be no recovery, however, if the plaintiff's
reliance was unreasonable. In Shivers v. Sweda International,Inc.,274
the court found that there had been no fraud since the purchaser confessed that his reliance on the salesman's promises was "naive," "very
stupid," and "unreasonable."
275
The plaintiff has no duty to investigate a representation of fact.
If the representation is obviously false or specifically disclaimed, how276
ever, there can be no claim of justified reliance.
4. Damages
Finally, a plaintiff must prove that it suffered damage as a direct
result of the misrepresentations:
The measure of damages is the loss naturally and directly resulting
from the fraud. It is composed of two essential elements-the difference between what the plaintiff paid ... and the benefit received from
269. See CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 1709-1710(2) (West 1973).
270. Gagne v. Bertran, 43 Cal. 2d 481, 488, 275 P.2d 15, 20 (1954).
271. See Fruit Indus. Research Found. v. National Cash Register Co., 406 F.2d 546, 548
(9th Cir. 1969).
272. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 537 (1977).
273. See, e.g., Clements Auto Co. v. Service Bureau Corp., 444 F.2d 169, 183 (8th Cir.
1971), affg 298 F. Supp. 115 (D. Minn. 1969) ("[W]e take notice of the inequality of knowledge as between the parties."); Strand v. Librascope, Inc., 197 F. Supp. 743 (E.D. Mich.
1961). But see Applications, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 501 F. Supp. 129, 136 (S.D.N.Y.
1980).
274. 146 Ga. App. 758, 247 S.E.2d 576 (1978).
275. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 540 (1977).
276. Id. § 541; Walker, Computer Litigation and the Manufacturer'sDefenses Against

Fraud,3 COMPUTER/L.J. 427, 449 (1982).
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the services rendered as well as such other special damages as were
277
naturally and directly caused by the fraud.
Damages that have been awarded in computer fraud cases include
(i) amounts paid on the contract less any benefits received, 278 (ii) costs
28 0
27 9
(iii) maintenance costs,
of leasing additional equipment,
281
(iv) increased labor costs,
(v) increased supply costs, 28 2 (vi) salaries
for supervisors of a data processing system, 28 3 (vii) the value of excess
inventory ordered because an inventory control system was not working,28 4 (viii) interest on amounts paid to the defendant or a third party
leasing company, 28 5 (ix) conversion costs, 28 6 (x) the cost of removing
computer equipment from the plaintiff's premises, 28 7 (xi) the cost of
purchasing outside computer time, 288 (xii) the costs of physical modification to a building (such as new wiring) in anticipation of the system, 289 and (xiii) punitive or exemplary damages. 2 90 While the
existence of damages must be proven by the plaintiff, the fact that the
amount of those damages cannot be calculated exactly will not preclude
29 1
recovery by the plaintiff.
5.

Duty to Mitigate

The plaintiff has a duty to mitigate its damages. "As a general rule,
'a party defrauded cannot, after discovery of the fraud, increase his
damages by continuing to expend money on the property retained and
recover for such expenditures .... ,-292 The plaintiff's duty in this regard will depend on the facts of the particular case.29 3 The following
277. Clements, 298 F. Supp. at 132; see also CAL. CIV. CODE

§§

1709, 3333, 3343 (West

1973).
278. C/ements, 298 F. Supp. 115.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id.; Applied Data Processing, Inc. v. Burroughs Corp., 394 F. Supp. 504, 511 (D.
Conn. 1975).
282. Clements, 298 F. Supp. 115.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Applied Data Processing, 394 F. Supp. at 511.

287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Glovatorium, Inc. v. NCR Corp., 684 F.2d 658 (9th Cir. 1982); CAL. CIv. CODE
§ 3294 (West 1970) (if intent to defraud shown).
291. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359, 379 (1927),
quoted with approval in Clements, 298 F. Supp. at 141.
292. Clements, 298 F. Supp. at 136.

293. Id.
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are some factors that have been found to support an award for damages
suffered after the plaintiff had learned of the fraud:
1. The defendant continued to represent that the problem could be
corrected, and the plaintiff reasonably relied on these
representations.
2. The plaintiff had already made a sizable investment in the system, and the investment would have been lost or seriously impaired had the plaintiff ceased using the system.
3. The plaintiff did not have a reasonable alternative system to turn
to.

294

6. Effect of ContractualLimitations or Disclaimers
Fraudulent representations can be made either as part of a final
written agreement between the parties or orally in pre-contract negotiations. While integration clauses and warranty disclaimers may provide
valid defenses against breach of contract claims, most jurisdictions do
not permit their use to avoid liability for fraud. 295 The same is true
296
with regard to contractual limitations on liability.
G.

BAD FAITH

Courts have long held that "in every contract there is an implied
covenant that neither party shall do anything which will have the effect
of destroying or injuring the right of the other party to receive the
fruits of the contract .... -297 The actionable wrong that arises from
breach of this duty of good faith and fair dealing is generally referred to
as "bad faith." Although based on the contractual relationship, a bad
faith claim is considered ex contractu (outside of the contract) and
sounds in tort. While this cause of action developed in the field of insurance contracts, 298 it has long been held applicable in non-insurance
294. Id.
295. See, e.g., id.; Applied Data Processing, Inc. v. Burroughs Corp., 394 F. Supp. 504,
510-11 (D. Conn. 1975); see also U.C.C. § 1-103 (1979) ("Unless displaced by the particular
provisions of this Act, the principles of law and equity, including the law merchant and
the law relative to . . .fraud, misrepresentation . . . or other validating or invalidating
cause shall supplement its provisions.").
296. See, e.g., IBM Corp. v. Catamore Enters., Inc., 548 F.2d 1065, 1076 (1st Cir. 1976)
(dictum); Applications, Inc. v. Hewlett Packard Co., 501 F. Supp. 129, 134-35 (S.D.N.Y.
1980); C/ements, 298 F. Supp. 115. Contra Glovatorium, Inc. v. NCR Corp., 684 F.2d 658,
662 n.4 (9th Cir. 1982); CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294 (West 1970) (if intent to defraud shown);
National Cash Register Co. v. Modern Transfer Co., 224 Pa. Super. 138, 147, 302 A.2d 486,
491 (1973).
297. Nelson v. Abraham, 29 Cal. 2d 745, 751, 177 P.2d 931, 934 (1947).
298. See, e.g., Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 23 Cal. 3d 880, 883, 592 P.2d 329,
332, 153 Cal. Rptr. 842, 845 (1979); Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 575, 510 P.2d
1032, 1037-38, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480, 485 (1973).

1985]

COMMERCIAL USER-VENDOR LITIGATION

cases as well. 299 Bad faith claims are often accompanied by other related or overlapping claims, including breach of contract, 300 fraud, 30 1 intentional infliction of emotional distress,30 2 and conspiracy to commit a
30 3
tort (for example, conspiracy to defraud).
Actions of a vendor that could potentially give rise to a claim of bad
faith include (i) refusal to repair defective equipment under a warranty
provision or maintenance contract; (ii) unreasonable delay in providing
promised equipment, software, and repairs; (iii) deceptive representations; (iv) cancellation of a maintenance agreement with malice or for
the purpose of making an example of the user in order to deter others
from acting as the user did; (v) deceptive representations or manipulation of records to support a refusal to repair; (vi) falsely accusing the
user of "tampering" with the equipment as a basis for refusal to repair
the equipment; (vii) falsely claiming that another vendor's product is
causing a reported malfunction; (viii) unreasonably interpreting records
or contract provisions to defeat a user's reasonable expectations;
(ix) using deception or threats to force a user into an unjust settlement
or into a waiver of rights; (x) making oppressive demands on the user as
a basis for complying with contractual claims; and (xi) packaging and
selling used hardware as new.
Pursuing a bad faith claim in addition to, or instead of, a claim for
breach of contract has more than psychological value. Unlike a contract
claim, under a cause of action for bad faith a plaintiff is not bound by
contractual provisions that limit the liability of the vendor. 30 4 The
plaintiff can recover all damages proximately caused by the vendor's
30 5
bad faith, including loss of earnings and other purely economic losses,
299. See, e.g., Universal Sales Corp. v. California Press Mfg. Co., 20 Cal. 2d 751, 771, 128
P.2d 665, 677 (1942) (machine sales contract); Cleary v. American Airlines, 111 Cal. App.
3d 443, 453, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722, 728 (1980) (employment agreement); Orange County Cable
Communications Co. v. City of San Clemente, 59 Cal. App. 3d 165, 172, 130 Cal. Rptr. 429,
434 (1976) (cable TV franchise). But see Seaman's Direct Buying Serv., Inc. v. Standard
Oil Co., 129 Cal. App. 3d 416, 429-31, 181 Cal. Rptr. 126, 134 (1982) ("something more" than
a simple breach of the implied covenent is required before recovery in tort is justified in
non-insurance cases), cited in Consolidated Data Terminals v. Applied Digital Data Sys.,
Inc., 708 F.2d 385, 399-400 (9th Cir. 1983) ("in absence of further guidance from California
courts concerning this potentially expansive new theory of tort liability [the trial court
properly dismissed the claim for breach of duty of good faith]").
300. See Austero v. National Casualty Co., 84 Cal. App. 3d 1, 148 Cal. Rptr. 653 (1978).
301. See Wetherbee v. United Ins. Co., 265 Cal. App. 2d 921, 71 Cal. Rptr. 764 (1968).
302. See Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78
(1970).
303. See Younan v. Equifax, Inc., 111 Cal. App. 3d 498, 169 Cal. Rptr. 478 (1980).
304. See supra text accompanying notes 34-39.
305. See Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 580, 510 P.2d 1032, 1041-42, 108 Cal.
Rptr. 480, 489-90 (1973).

COMPUTER/LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. V

damages for emotional distress, 30 6 punitive damages, 3° 7 and attorneys'
30 8
fees.
H.

RICO

In 1970, Congress enacted the Organized Crime Control Act. 30 9 As
part of that Act Congress adopted a series of laws entitled the "Racketx
eer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 310 more commonly
known as RICO. The purpose of RICO was "to seek eradication of organized crime in the United States by strengthening the legal tools in
the evidence-gathering process by establishing penal provisions and by
providing sanctions and new remedies to deal with the unlawful activi3 11
ties of those engaged in organized crime.

1.

Civil Liability

Although the RICO statutes are generally criminal in nature, they
provide for civil remedies for improper activities by corporations and individuals, and can be a powerful remedy for fraudulent practices in the
computer industry.
RICO gives standing to sue to any person whose business or property is injured by reason of a violation of section 1962, and further provides that such person "may sue therefor in any appropriate United
sustains
States district court and shall recover threefold the damages he312
and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee."
Section 1962 specifies four types of activities that violate the
statute:
1. investment of income derived from a pattern of racketeering ac3 13
tivity in an enterprise;
2. acquisition of an interest in an enterprise through racketeering
3 14
activities;
315
3. participation in an enterprise through racketeering activity;
and
306. See Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 433, 426 P.2d 173, 178-79, 58 Cal.
Rptr. 13, 18-19 (1967).
307. See Silberg v. California Life Ins. Co., 11 Cal. 3d 452, 462, 521 P.2d 1103, 1110, 113
Cal. Rptr. 711, 718 (1974).
308. See Mustachio v. Ohio Farmers Ins. Co., 44 Cal. App. 3d 358, 364 n.7, 118 Cal. Rptr.
581, 585 n.7 (1975).
309. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 941.
310. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982).
311. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 1, 84 Stat. 941.
312. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982).
313. Id. § 1962(a).
314. I& § 1962(b).
315. Id § 1962(c).
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4. conspiracy to violate any of the foregoing proscriptions.3 16
Subdivision (c) of the Act (number (3) above) provides fertile ground
for civil actions against fraudulent practices of those marketing computer products. Subdivision (c) states:
It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any
enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the
conduct of such enterprise affairs through a pattern of racketeering ac317
tivity or collection of unlawful debt.

2.

Definitions

To understand the far-reaching implications of this section of
RICO, it is necessary to see how the various terms are defined in the
Act. Section 1961(1)(B) defines "racketeering" as "any act which is indictable under any of the following provisions of title 18, United States
Code: . . . section 1341 (relating to mail fraud), section 1343 (relating to
",318
wire fraud) ....
3.

Pattern of Racketeering

A "pattern of racketeering activity," which is key to all of the section 1962 offenses, "requires at least two acts of racketeering activity,
one of which occurred after the effective date of this chapter and the
last of which occurred within ten years (excluding any period of impris31 9
onment) after the commission of a prior act of racketeering activity.t
Of all the substantive offenses set forth in section 1961(1), those
most relevant to the computer contract area are those relating to mail

fraud3 20 and wire fraud.3 21 Under these broadly defined offenses, if a
316. Id. § 1962(d).
317. Id. § 1964(c).
318. Id. § 1961.
319. Id. § 1961(5).
320. Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises ...
for the purpose of executing such
scheme or artifice or attempting so to do, places in any post office or authorized
depository for mail, any matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by the
Postal Service, or takes or receives therefrom, any such matter or thing, or knowingly causes to be delivered by mail ... any such matter or thing, shall be fined
not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both.
I1- § 1341.
321. Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, transmits or causes to be transmitted by
means of wire, radio or television communication in interstate or foreign commerce, any writings, signs, signals, pictures, or sounds for the purpose of executing such a scheme or artifice, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned
not more than 5 years, or both.
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computer salesperson were to state during a telephone conversation
with a potential customer that his company could provide a computer
system that met the customer's needs, and followed that up with a letter containing the same representations, his company could be found to
have engaged in a "racketeering activity" if the representations were
fraudulently made. Two telephone calls made the same day from the
same place would be sufficient to establish a "pattern of racketeering."3 22 A RICO violation could take place even if the letter did not
contain a fraudulent representation, so long as the letter was "sufficiently related" to the fraudulent scheme, that is, aided in the completion of the fraud. 323 The communications need not further the scheme,
but only need be made for the purpose of executing it.3 24 Thus a RICO
violation could occur if a fraudulent representation were made by telephone followed by a purchase order sent to the customer by mail, even
if the purchase order itself contained nothing fraudulent.
The two acts, however, need not be related. For example, if a
plaintiff could show that a computer vendor committed one act of mail
fraud in its contract negotiations with the plaintiff, and the same vendor committed a similar act of mail fraud six years earlier in its dealings
with another customer, a "pattern of racketeering" would be established. All that is required is that the acts be in the conduct of the affairs of the same enterprise, and occur within a ten year period.3 25
The commerce requirement of RICO is extremely lenient. It would
be difficult to imagine a computer vendor that did not satisfy the requirement, since only the "enterprise" need affect commerce, not the
pattern of racketeering. 326 An "enterprise" does not have to be connected with the Mafia or other group of organized criminals, 327 but includes any individual, partnership, corporation, association or other
legal entity, and any group of individuals associated in fact, though not
a legal entity. 328 This definition will cover virtually any computer vendor, no matter what its business form. Unauthorized actions by a salesperson cannot subject the vendor to liability, 329 but the salesperson can
3
be held liable individually.

30

Id. § 1343.
322. See United States v. Moeller, 402 F. Supp. 49, 58 (D. Conn. 1975).
323. United States v. Tarnopol, 561 F.2d 466, 475-76 (3d Cir. 1977).
324. United States v. Hammond, 598 F.2d 1008, 1010 (5th Cir. 1979).
325. United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 778, 782-85 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
326. See United States v. Vignola, 464 F. Supp. 1091, 1097-98 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
327. See, e.g., Barr v. WUI/TAS, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 109, 113 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
328. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1982).
329. United States v. Dennis, 458 F. Supp. 197, 198 (E.D. Mo.1978).
330. See, e.g., United States v. Field, 432 F. Supp. 55, 58 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), affd, 578 F.2d
1371 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 439 U.S. 801 (1978).
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Cases

Two cases in the computer/communications field illustrate the po331
tential for RICO claims. In United States v. Marubeni America Corp.
Marubeni and Hitachi Cable Ltd., two wholly legitimate, multinational
corporations, were named as defendants in a RICO criminal indictment.
The Government alleged that Marubeni's local representative, who was
not an officer of the company, bribed a representative of a utility company in exchange for information on bids submitted to the utility by
competitors. Based on the information obtained, the defendants underbid their competitors and received the contract. The defendants were
indicted on 63 counts of mail fraud, wire fraud, interstate transportation
to commit bribery, conspiracy, and racketeering. One count of the indictment sought forfeiture of all sums paid by the utility to the defendants for the cable purchased pursuant to the contract. While there does
not appear to have been a civil RICO action filed by the utility against
the defendants, such an action would have been appropriate.
Computer Terminal Systems, Inc. v. Gross 3 3 2 involved a civil action
under RICO against a computer hardware company. Computer Terminal Systems, Inc. (CTS), a manufacturer of equipment used in connection with computer printers, sued its former president and director and
two former employees under RICO. The complaint alleged that CTS
received a proposal to provide replacement blower-motor units for computers, the defendants conspired to cause CTS to subcontract the work
to a corporation (CJL) created by the defendants, and CJL paid kickbacks to the defendants.
The bases for the RICO claim were commercial bribery and illegal
use of the mails, telephones and interstate commerce to promote the
unlawful activity. Defendants' motion to dismiss the RICO claim was
denied.
CONCLUSION
While the user is at a disadvantage at virtually every stage of the
contracting process, from the negotiating stage to the contract-drafting
phase and even in any resulting litigation, all is not lost. In every vendor-user dispute counsel for the user must review all of the options
carefully, lest an opportunity for substantial recovery be missed.

331. 611 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1980).
332. 1982-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,531 (E.D.N.Y. 1981).

